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Abstract 
Using an institutionalist approach as the main framework, this research examines the evolution of 
Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives over the last six decades through four distinct phases - the 
voluntary collectivization period of 1954-1975, the compulsory collectivization period of 1975-1981, the 
de-collectivization period of 1981-1997 and the neo-collectivization period since 1997. Based on two case 
studies, this research examines the role of the Vietnamese government in the development of 
Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives. It argues that a stable legal environment and appropriate 
government support are extremely important for the successful development of cooperatives. In terms of 
theoretical contribution, the study calls for an integration of the notion of institutional dynamics into the 
current 'static' institutionalism and emphasizes the need to analyse institutions' influences at central, 
local and organizational levels to understand the formation and development of organizations. It also 
offers some policy implications that are relevant to the development of cooperatives in other economies. 
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GOVERNMENTAL INFLUENCES ON THE EVOLUTION OF AGRICULTURAL 
COOPERATIVES IN VIETNAM 
Abstract 
Using an institutionalist approach as the main framework, this research examines the 
evolution of Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives over the last six decades through four 
distinct phases - the voluntary collectivization period of 1954-1975, the compulsory 
collectivization period of 1975-1981, the de-collectivization period of 1981 – 1997 and the 
neo-collectivization period since 1997. Based on two case studies, this research examines the 
role of the Vietnamese government in the development of Vietnamese agricultural 
cooperatives. It argues that a stable legal environment and appropriate government support 
are extremely important for the successful development of cooperatives. In terms of 
theoretical contribution, the study calls for an integration of the notion of institutional 
dynamics into the current ‘static’ institutionalism and emphasises the need to analyse 
institutions’ influences at central, local and organisational levels to understand the formation 
and development of organisations. It also offers some policy implications that are relevant to 
the development of cooperatives in other economies. 
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Agriculture has long been an important sector  in the Vietnamese economy.In 2011, 
earnings from the agriculture sector, which includes farming, forestry and fishery, 
accounted for 22.02 per cent of Vietnam's gross domestic product (GDP) (GSO 2012). The 
agriculture sector’s share of economic output has declined in recent years, falling as a 
share of GDP from 40.49 per cent in 1991 to 25.77 per cent in 1997 and to around 20 per 
cent since 2005, as growth in other sectors of the economy has gained pace. However, 
Vietnam can be still called an agricultural country, as this sector remains the major source 
of employment (Wolz and Pham 2010). About 50 per cent of the Vietnamese labour force 
works in the agricultural sector (Nguyen 2012).  In 2012, 68 per cent of the total 
population live in rural areas (GSO 2013, 63). 
Agricultural cooperatives were an essential tool in combatting poverty in the 1950s and 
today play a crucial role in promoting effective allocation of resources and efficiency in 
production in Vietnam. However, ever since the birth of the co-operative movement in the 
agriculture sector, the development and evolution of this form of economic organisation 
has not been an easy process.  The present day concept of agricultural cooperatives in 
Vietnam is the outcome of a long drawn out process of development. In retrospect, the 
development of Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives can be classified into four distinct 
phases: (1) the voluntary collectivisation period of 1954-1975; (2) the compulsory 
collectivisation period of 1975-1981; (3) the de-collectivisation period of 1981 – 1997; 
and (4) the neo-collectivisation period since 1997. 
Despite the fact that agricultural collectivisation is a significant issue in contemporary 
Vietnamese political and economic history, there has been a limited amount of research on 
Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives. Existing research in this area has focused 
predominantly on the impact of agriculture sector on the Vietnamese economy (Truong 
1987; Pingali and Vo 1992; Asian Development Bank 2002; Nguyen 2003), land reform 
and distribution (Moise 1983; Ravallion and Van de Walle 2003; Kerkvliet, 2006), 
agricultural techniques and innovation (Kaiser 1997; Foerster and Nguyen 1999; Nguyen 
2000; Nguyen 2007), agricultural productivity (Bui 2003; Ho 2012), economic reforms and 
their impact on agriculture (Tran, 1998a), and government policies on agricultural 
development (Cohen 2001). Nevertheles, agricultural cooperatives have been under-
studied. In particular, there is a dearth of empirical studies on the evolution of agricultural 
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cooperatives after Vietnam’s new Cooperative Law of 1997 was launched and the role of 
the government and its agencies in this process. While there are a few notable studies, such 
as Truong (1987), Kerkvliet (1994, 1998, 2005, 2006), Tran (1998a, 1998b), Wolz and 
Pham (2010), which provided excellent analyses of agricultural cooperatives in different 
periods and of the impact of economic reforms on agricultural cooperatives, surprisingly 
there has not been a review of the performance of Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives 
that covers their development from their establishment in the 1950s until today.  
The purpose of this study is, therefore, two-fold. Firstly, it aims to fill the gap in the 
literature by presenting a comprehensive review on Vietnam's agricultural cooperatives in 
the past six decades, with an emphasis on the period after the issue of the new 1997 
Cooperatives Law. Secondly, it examines the development of contemporary agricultural 
cooperatives and the role that government agencies have played in this process. It explores 
some interrelated research questions, namely 1) How have Vietnamese agricultural 
cooperatives developed in the last six decades? 2) How do government agencies support 
the operations of agricultural cooperatives?  and 3) How will the agricultural cooperatives 
evolve in the future?  
2. Literature Review  
This section highlights the relevance of the institutional framework for the analysis of 
economic structures and their behaviours. The institutionalist approach provides a valuable 
method for understanding the evolution and perpetuation of firms’ behaviours. It then 
discusses the formation and evolution of Vietnamese agricultural cooperative models over 
the last six decades.  
The institutionalist approach and its application in understanding the evolution of firms 
Recent decades have witnessed the strong development of institutionalism. Comparative 
institutionalism analysis shows how different forms of economic organisation have been 
established, reproduced and changed in different market economies. It focuses on macro-
level societal institutions, in particular those that govern ‘access to critical resources, 
especially labour and capital’ (Whitley, 1999: 47).  
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A systematic analysis of main national institutions and the interactions between these 
institutional arrangements and the activities of business organisations has been 
conceptualised in terms of ‘societal logic’ (Maurice et al., 1996), ‘social systems of 
production’ (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997), ‘industrial orders’ (Herrigel, 1996), ‘national 
industrial order’  (Lane, 1992) or ‘ national business systems’ (Whitley, 1999). Lane’s 
framework (1992) for example consists of the state, the financial system, the system of 
education and training, and to a lesser extent, the network of business associations and the 
system of industrial relations. Institutionalism explains how national institutions impose 
structural limitations on social actors and mediate or modify international pressures. 
The effects of variations in businesses’ institutional contexts on firms’ behaviour are 
prominent, as a ‘firm will gravitate towards the mode of coordination for which there is 
institutional support’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 9). It is now widely accepted that the influence 
of such social institutions is so strong that they can almost be regarded as additional factors of 
production which become the basis of competitive advantage or disadvantage (Maurice at al., 
1980; Lane, 1992; Porter, 1990). The role of the government for instance in economic 
planning and controlling in different countries affects a firm’s organisational structure, its 
willingness to undertake long-term investments, and its dependence on state agencies in 
making decisions. In this case, what is ‘rational’ strategic behaviour is determined according 
to the role of the state.  
The main contribution of the institutionalist approach is the establishment of a conceptual 
framework allowing study of firms’ behaviours. However, the institutional perspective is 
criticised, firstly, as being insensitive to the ‘soft’ part in business organisations. Firm 
behaviour is over-determined by national stereotypes and the potential for human agency 
neglected within this framework (Gamble, 2001).  Secondly, it might be problematic when 
applying an institutionalist approach to understand a business system in its transitional 
period, where ‘previously latent institutions may suddenly become salient, old institutions 
may be put in the service of different ends or actors goals or strategies may shift within 
existing institutions’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 16).  
The Formation and Evolution of Vietnamese Agricultural Cooperative Models 
The International Cooperative Alliance defined a cooperative as ‘an autonomous 
association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and 
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cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled 
enterprise’ (ICA 2013). Neoclassical economists suggested that economic agents will co-
ordinate their actions and engage in industry development activities whenever the benefits 
from doing so outweigh the costs. Chloupková (2002) argued that one of the characteristics 
of the cooperatives under the communist regime was forced membership, and as a result 
these cooperatives did not obey the principles set by ICA, even though they were touted by 
the government as collective farms aimed at ‘joining resources and sharing benefits’. 
Parnell (1992) aptly pointed out that in communist countries, cooperatives were considered 
as a stepping stone to less centralised economies and in capitalist countries  as a 
counterbalance to the strongly capitalist market-based system. 
Agricultural Cooperatives in the Voluntary Collectivisation Period of 1954-1975 
During the French colonial period, there was a high concentration of land in the hands of 
a small elite group of French and Vietnamese. According to Wolf (1999, 166), in the 
Northern region of Vietnam, 500 large landowners, both French and Vietnamese, owned 
20 per cent of the land; another 17,000 held a further 20 per cent. The remaining small 
holders, about one million, owned the rest of the agricultural land. This situation caused 
great class conflicts between landowners, small land owners and tenant farmers, which 
contributed directly to periodic rural unrest in the 1920s–1930s and the revolutionary 
war for independence (1945–1954) (Kerkvliet 2006). 
In 1954, after the defeat of the French at the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the Vietnamese 
communists took control of North Vietnam. The Geneva Accords effectively resulted in a 
fragmented Vietnam with two sovereign states - the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 
the North, led by the Vietnamese Communist Party, and the Republic of Vietnam, 
supported by America, in the South. The North and the South developed along two very 
different paths in terms of politics and economics. The North’s economy developed all the 
characteristics of a Soviet-style socialist centralised economic system, while the South’s 
economy was decentralised and heavily dependent on America. 
In the South, the Vietnamese-American government emphasized private property and 
was in favour of large land owners at the expenses of the peasants (Callison1983; 
Kerkvliet 2006). This policy continued until 1970, when the government began a 
redistribution of land and implemented the ‘land to the tiller’ programme.  The result was 
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that approximately 1.3 million hectares of agricultural land was redistributed to over one 
million farmers by the end of 1974 (Pingali and Vo 1992).  
In the North, large landowners and rich peasants were publicly denounced as landlords, 
and their land redistributed to poor and middle class peasants, particularly to those with 
ties to the Communist Party. By 1956, this programme of redistribution had transferred 
ownership of substantially all the available land to farmers in a largely equitable manner 
which benefitted approximately 73 per cent of the North’s rural population (Truong 1987, 
35). The North also entered a stage of agricultural collectivization.  
The initial steps were to establish work-exchange teams (to doi cong), a simple form of 
agricultural collectivisation, which included the majority of the farmers. This collective 
economic form was organized on the principle of voluntary participation. Farmers retained 
ownership of land and equipment and were in control of production on their land but were 
encouraged to assist each other during periods of peak labour demand by joining seasonal 
or permanent working teams. The work-exchange teams helped to improve agricultural 
production during the post-war period. As a result, food output increased 57 per cent with 
average food per capita of 303 kg per year. This not only ensured food for domestic 
consumption but also yielded a surplus for export in1956 and 1957 (Tran 1998a, 32). 
Encouraged by the positive results of this ‘golden period’ (Tran 1998a, 32), the 
Government decided to accelerate the agriculture collectivisation program throughout 
North Vietnam. Work-exchange teams were transformed into agricultural cooperatives, 
starting out at a low level (1958-1960) and advancing to the high level of cooperatives 
(1960-1972). The low level of cooperatives worked on the principle that farmers also 
kept their own land, traction animals and equipment but farmed according to the general 
plan of the cooperative, while in the high level of cooperatives, all land and farm 
instruments were put under cooperative properties and farmers worked under a unified 
management (Pingali and Vo 1992).  
Initially, the collectivisation movement achieved some success. The stage of low level 
agricultural cooperatives, between 1959 and 1960, witnessed a sharp increase in the 
number of cooperatives established. By the end of 1960, 40,422 cooperatives were setup 
throughout North Vietnam, encompassing over 2.4 million peasant households, accounting 
for 86 percent of the total households (Tran 1998a, 32). However, this early success was 
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short-lived.  Between 1962-1975, the average growth in the yield of rice, the most 
important crop of the country, was only 1.1 per cent per year with negative growth in seven 
out of fourteen years (FAO 2000 as quoted in Nguyen 2000, 25). The reasons that the 
system did not function as expected are many. Agricultural cooperatives constrained 
individual choice and eliminated the economic incentives required for efficient agricultural 
production and markets. The mandatory collectivisation policies resulted in the removal of 
private farm ownership, and reduced the economic incentives for farmers to produce and 
market their crops. These factors ultimately dampened farmers' enthusiasm for work and 
resulted in both low agricultural efficiency and productivity (Tran 1998b).  
Agricultural Cooperatives in the Compulsory Collectivisation Period of 1975-1981 
After the country was reunited in1975, the Communist Party quickly sought to establish a 
socialist production in the hitherto capitalist-oriented South and thus bring this part of the 
country in line with the North. The Communist Party outlawed tenancy and enforced 
agricultural cooperatives in the South. In these cooperatives, the cultivation of crops, the 
division of labour, and the distribution of the harvest was bureaucratically managed and the 
state retained the ownership of land. Farmers were subjected to a food obligation policy 
that was implemented in 1978 and 1979, which required them  to sell a quota  of grain  to  
the  state  at  fixed  prices  in  exchange  for  fertiliser,  gasoline,  bricks,  and  consumer 
goods  at  subsidized prices. Free market prices for grain were eight times higher  than  
state  prices while  state-supplied  goods were usually inferior  in quality,  insufficient  in 
quantity, and delivered  late, which interrupted planting  and thereby  hurt production 
(Raymond 2008). 
The policy faced with stiff resistance from farmers from the very early stage. The level of 
success of collectivisation and the forced cooperatives program varied significantly in 
different regions. According to Tran (1998a, 33), in central of Vietnam in 1978, over 
67,000 peasant households participated in cooperatives. By the end of 1980 there were 
673,500 households in cooperatives, accounting for 83.8 percent of the number of 
agricultural households. In the eastern region of South Vietnam, only 1.6 percent of the 
total peasant households had joined cooperatives by the end of 1978. In the western 
region, the Mekong delta, the situation was even worse with only 0.2 percent of all peasant 
households joining cooperatives. Despite all efforts, the government’s attempt to use a 
collective mode of production to increase productivity and achieve a large surplus was 
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mostly unsuccessful. By the late 1970s, after two decades of collectivisation, only 10–15 
per cent of all farming collectives in the North fulfilled the Communist Party government’s 
standards. About 15 per cent were ‘relatively good’. The rest, 70 –75 per cent, failed to 
reach the government’s expectations of cooperatives (Nhu 1979, 42 as quoted in Kerkvliet 
2006, 293). During the post war period of 1976-1981, the national rice yield grew by a rate 
as low as one per cent per year. Vietnam was a major food importer during this period 
(Nguyen 2000, 25). 
Agricultural Cooperatives in the De-Collectivisation Period of 1981 – 1997 
This period was marked by signicant reform in the Vietnamese economy in general and 
agricultural cooperatives in particular. After the unification, under the socialist economic 
system, the state and collective sectors, which were highly subsidised by the state budget, 
were the foundation of the economy. Large-scale private economic organisations were 
forced or encouraged to join the state or collective sectors. This process effectively 
eliminated the market mechanism except in small-scale (household) activities.  Therefore, 
it became clear as early as 1977 that the economic strategy was not working, with the 
economy witnessing steady declines in production and productivity in vital industries, 
including agriculture (Le and McCarty, 1995: 100). In 1980, Vietnam’s GDP growth rate 
was –1.6 per cent (Statistical Yearbook 1995). In the same year, food production reached 
only 69 per cent of its target (Vu 1995, 19). By the mid-1980s, Vietnamese economy was 
barely sustained thanks to significant assistance from the Eastern bloc (now a burdensome 
debt for Vietnam). The lowest point was reached in 1985, when a miscalculated currency 
reform plan was introduced, effectively re-valuing the Dong, in a bid to reduce the amount 
of money circulating and encourage the import-reliant economy but in fact resulted in an 
escalating inflation rate. As Wurfel (1993: 23) puts it ‘Economic necessity was the mother 
of [Vietnamese] reformist invention’.  
At the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party in 1986, the Vietnamese government 
introduced a comprehensive reform program, known as Doi Moi, with the objective of 
liberalising and deregulating the economy. The agricultural reform in Vietnam actually 
started before the Doi Moi. On the 13th January 1981, Vietnam introduced the Directive No 
100 CT/TW on ‘improvement of contractual activities and extension of product 
contracts to labour groups and individuals in the agricultural production cooperatives’ 
(‘Contract 100’ for short) into the agricultural production sector. For the first time since the 
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establishment of agricultural cooperatives, the government recognised market forces in the 
operation of cooperatives. Under the ‘contractual’ mechanism, cooperatives entrusted land 
to a member household on a contract. Farmers were responsible for sowing, seedling 
transplanting, tending and harvesting of the crop (known as the three production links). 
Subsequent phases in processing and marketing were still the responsibility of the 
cooperatives. All land and production means were s t i l l  placed under the management 
and disposition of the cooperatives. The household had to deliver a quota of food to the 
state as stipulated in the contract but could use five per cent of their land privately and sell 
the surplus product on the market (Beresford 1999, 13). The new system enabled individual 
farm households to cultivate more independently and to be responsible for providing the 
contracted amount of output to the state (Pingali and Vo 1992; Nguyen 2000).  
The initial reform had positive effects on agricultural production. National rice production 
increased from 226 kilograms  per person in 1981 to  256 in 1982 and annual harvests  of 
food  crops  rose  from  15.0 million tons in 1981 to 17.8 million tons in 1984 (Raymond 
2008, 52). However, the growth occurred mainly in the first year after ‘Contract 100’ was 
implemented. After 1982, the country again experienced a continual decrease in the rice 
yield growth rate from year to year, which became negative in 1987. Pingali and Vo (1992) 
argued that the main reasons for this failure was the cumbersome, top down planning 
approach in production, the frequent failure of the state to buy all the contracted products 
from farmers due to limited funds, and the lack of security in land tenure resulting in 
insufficient investments at the farm level. Fundamentally the cooperative model was still 
based on collective ownership, centrally run management and the uniform distribution 
of products based on workdays. Collective farmers were paid ‘work points’, which were 
converted into amounts of agricultural products such as rice and other food and 
occasionally money through an elaborate assessment method that assured everyone a 
basic share of each collective’s net income but provided little reward for productivity 
and innovation (Kerkvliet 2006). 
In response to the problem of critically low agricultural production in the second half of 
the 1980s, the Vietnamese government promulgated Resolution No. 10 NQ/TW in 1988 
(All Around Renovation of Economic Management in Agriculture), which created 
fundamental changes to the agricultural sector and to rural development. The significance 
of Resolution No.10 was the full recognition of the market mechanism in the operations of 
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cooperatives. The Resolution recognised farming households as the main units of 
agricultural production and further empowered farmers to manage all stages of production. 
The only obligation of the peasants and of the cooperatives to the state was to pay 
agricultural taxes (Pingali and Vo 1992). Resolution No. 10 was strongly supported by the 
Land Law 1993 and its revisions in 1998 and 2000, which provided security in land use 
rights for farmers. The main feature of the land reform policies was the privatisation of 
land-use rights with farmers granted 25 years of land use right for rice and other annual 
crops and 50 years of land use right for perennial crops (ownership right to the land, 
however, remained with the State) (Pham and Nguyen 2005). 
Agricultural Cooperatives in the Neo-Collectivisation Period Since 1997 
Although cooperatives continued to exist, their major traditional tasks in agricultural 
production were no longer needed (Wolz and Pham 2010). Many of them failed to provide 
the necessary services to the newly-established family farmers, especially input supply 
(Sultan and Wolz 2012). In this context, the Cooperative Law was introduced in 1997. 
According to Sultan and Wolz (2012), the Cooperative Law was developed based on the 
basic principles of the international cooperative movement and reflected user-centred policies 
and voluntary membership.  Compared with the old model, the new model focuses more on 
providing services and marketing activities to its members (Table 1). 
Insert Table 1 here  
There were three options for previously existing agricultural cooperatives under the new law 
(Wolz and Pham 2010). They included: (i) the conversion of the old style agricultural 
cooperatives into viable agricultural service cooperatives that had to be newly-registered; (ii) 
the dissolution of old style agricultural cooperatives; and (iii) the formation and registration 
of new agricultural service cooperatives. There was an initial lack of interest from 
cooperatives in the conversion process and it took much longer than anticipated to finalise 
(Sultan and Wolz 2012).   
Since the new Cooperative Law became effective in 1997, it has been revised twice in 2003 
and 2012. The legal environment has been improving gradually to encourage the formulation 
and development of the new model of cooperatives. The second revision of the Cooperative 
Law in 2012 for example simplified the administrative procedures for cooperatives including 
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the registration, setting up of branches and closure of cooperatives. The time it takes to 
register a cooperative was cut from 15 days to 5 days. This aimed to facilitate the registration 
of new cooperatives, and expansion and even closure of current ones. 
The development of the cooperatives has been further supported in recent years with the 
establishment of the National Cooperative Assistance Fund in 2006. These funds were 
established to provide credit to cooperatives in their respective provinces and to help them 
expand business activities. Furthermore, since 2002 the concept of contract farming has been 
strongly supported by the Vietnamese government. There has been an increase in the number 
of agricultural cooperatives participating in contract farming since the promulgation of 
Decision 80 in 2002 which aimed to promote agricultural transformation from subsistence 
farming to a commercialised and export-oriented agricultural sector. This decision, often 
known as "four-party" contract, promotes cooperation between the state, farmers, research 
institutions and enterprises (Asian Development Bank 2005). It aims to improve procurement 
of agricultural cooperatives’ products, and to promote technology innovation in the rural 
economy. Neverthelesss, the model has not been very sucessful due to lack of trust, lack of 
professionalism, mismanagement of contract, lack of cooperation among parties. There is a 
need for clearly defined roles of the four parties,  good governance of the contract and an 
effective value chain.  
Performance of the New Agricultural Cooperatives  
As of 31st December 2010, there were 6,302 agricultural cooperatives (GSO 2012, 58). This 
represented a decline of 12.9 per cent during a five-year period from 2006 when the number 
of agricultural cooperatives was 7,237. The fall in number of agricultural cooperatives could 
be due to the closure and exit of inefficient cooperatives during the period when the 
Vietnamese economy experienced a downturn with GDP growth dropping from 8.23 per cent 
in 2006 to 5.89 per cent in 2011. In addition, the global financial crisis contributed to a fall in 
demand of Vietnamese agricultural products in international markets and as a result 
cooperatives also suffered.  In terms of economic performance, the capital-employee ratio in 
agricultural cooperatives reached 59.8 million Vietnamese dong (VND) in 2010 (equivalent 
to about 3,000USD in 2010), which was an increase of 13.9 per cent compared to 2005. 
However, average income for agricultural cooperative members is still very low, standing at 
only 201,000VND (about 11 USD) a month in 2010.  
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Figures from the 2011 Rural, Agricultural and Fishery Census revealed that agricultural 
cooperatives  employed 136,100 permanent workers in 2010, achieving a growth rate of 7.8 
per cent compared to 2006 (GSO 2012, 59).  Of the permanent workers about 128,000 are 
members of the cooperatives. As such, cooperative members made up 94.1 per cent of the 
total employment in the sector. The remaining 5.9 per cent of the workers are employed 
outside the cooperatives. The average size of a cooperative is about 22 workers of which 20 
are members (GSO 2012, 59). Hence their size is relatively small and it is difficult to achieve 
economies of scale. Nevertheless, the average size of a cooperative has risen by 24 per cent 
compared to the average size in 2006. Most of the workers employed in the agricultural 
cooperatives were between the ages of 35 to 55 accounting for almost 70 per cent of the 
employment in 2012. The second largest age group in the agricultural cooperatives is the 15 – 
34 age group with a share of about 18 per cent (GSO 2012, 59). The expanding size of 
cooperatives and the relatively young ages of cooperatives’ members appear as encouraging 
signs that potentially show the popularity of this economic organisation form with the new 
generation.  
In sum, as suggested by the insitutionalist theory, the government  has played an extremely 
important role in the formation and development of Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives.  
This form of economic organisation has undergone significant transformation since 1954.  
The statistics show a picture with some encouraging sights for the whole sector. Questions 
remain, however, on what happens at the micro-level (cooperative level). These questions 
include: How have the changes in the government’s policies impacted on the daily 
operations of agricultural cooperatives? How do government agencies support the 
operations of agricultural cooperatives?  How will the agricultural cooperatives evolve in 
the future?  
3. Research Methodology 
A case study approach is used in this study because of its suitability for exploratory and 
descriptive research, and studies where the phenomenon under investigation is very much 
socially and contextually situated (Yin 1994; Marshall and Rossman 1995).  Case studies 
enable researchers to observe phenomena as they occur in their settings, a feature that allows 
surrounding social and structural intricacies to be exposed and unravelled (Yin 1994).  This 
essentially provides a more accurate conception of events and behaviours, and a more 
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comprehensive understanding of the associations that influence the phenomenon in question 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Orum et al. 1991).   
Two agricultural cooperatives were chosen to study, coded in this research as AG1 and AG2 
(Table 2). Some criteria govern the choice of cooperatives: (1) the size of the cooperatives - 
priority is given to cooperatives that have a larger number of members; (2) age of the 
cooperatives. AG1 represents old cooperatives that have a long history dating back to pre-Doi 
Moi period. It has survived many waves of changes in government policies and thrived in the 
new context. Meanwhile AG2 represents the newcomers that have only been established in 
the last decade; and (3) accessibility to the cooperatives. 
Insert Table 2 here  
Interviews were the primary source of research data, and the focal point of the empirical 
research element of this work. There were two groups of interviewees: those inside the 
cooperatives and outside the cooperatives. The first group included the Chairman and/or Vice 
Chairman and members of the cooperatives (at least two at each cooperative). It was 
considered necessary to conduct interviews at two levels to cross check the information as 
well as to examine whether the policies stated and described by the board of management 
were indeed implemented at lower levels of the organisations. There was also a need to 
corroborate the information provided, and thereby reduce hidden bias and aid reliability. 
The second group included government officials from the Cooperative Department at the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment and the provincial Departments of Agriculture and 
Rural Development (DARD). These departments have played a very active role in 
implementing Decision 80, by supporting the establishment of cooperatives and facilitating 
the signing of contract farming between cooperatives and agricultural product purchasing 
companies. Interviewing personnel outside the enterprise context was considered vital, given 
that one of the aims of the research is to understand the role of the government and its 
agencies in the development of agricultural cooperatives.  
Interview questions were organised into six themes: history of the cooperatives, profiles of 
the households, their agricultural production, the households’ current use of cooperative 
services, the respondents’ assessments on the services provided by cooperatives and any 
factors that hinder or facilitate the operations of cooperatives. Semi-structured interviews 
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were conducted on site in 2004 and over the phone in 2013 to update data. The length of the 
interviews ranged from 30 to 80 minutes. In total, 17 interviews were carried out. The 
distribution and characteristics of the intervieweeare depicted in Table 3.  
Insert Table 3 here. 
Ethical considerations were taken into account in this research. Throughout the research 
process, steps were taken to ensure key interviewees were protected particularly in terms of 
their privacy and confidentiality. All participants were assured the information they provided 
would only be used to fulfil the aims of research, and were informed of their right to withdraw 
from the study at any time for any reason.   
4. Empirical study 
AG1 
AG1 was established during the period of central planning in 1978. During the compulsory 
collectivisation period, the whole production process from the cultivation stage to the 
distribution of the harvest was bureaucratically managed. The management of labour 
extended even to working hours which were announced by the village bell. Regardless of 
their productivity, farmers were required to sell a quota of grain to the state at fixed prices. In 
the de-collectivisation period, following Contract 100 issued in 1981, land was distributed to 
the households according to family size. Land that was brought in to the cooperative by 
households during the collectivisation phase was also returned to them. In this period, the role 
of agricultural cooperatives was reduced and households were recognised as the primary units 
of production.  
The Cooperative Law 1997 established the foundation for the old style agricultural 
cooperatives to convert into membership-oriented service providers. AG1 was revived and 
has successfully diversified services to its members, including input supply (fertilisers, 
pesticides and seeds), irrigation services, land preparation services, field protection services, 
marketing and selling of output and development of extra income-generating activities (such 
as poultry farming, handicraft production, construction services, ice factories, mixing of 
animal feeds). Irrigation services, in particular the maintenance of the distribution canals and 
the pumping of water, was considered one of the most important services offered by AG1 as 
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it required a level of cooperation between farmers. The fees and contributions for irrigation 
services was 450 kg paddy/ha per year. To operationalize this service, AG1 bought water 
from the irrigation companies and then provided water to internal channels leading to the rice 
fields.  It collected a fee from farmers for this service.  
AG1 was also involved in the signing of contract farming with purchasing companies. Based 
on farmers' production abilities of a specific agricultural product, the cooperative looked for 
markets for these products and represented farmers in contract negotiations and agreements 
with the purchasers. After signing the contracts with the companies, the cooperative 
established subsequent contracts for agricultural product procurement with its members and 
as such the cooperative played the intermediary role in this process.  
The interview with the commune authorities revealed that there was an emergence of 
linkages between cooperatives. AG1 formed linkages with other cooperatives in nearby 
localities and has maintained a regular exchange of information on market conditions, 
prices of materials and commodities, and sub-contracting prices in consumption contracts. 
This has helped to enhance the competitiveness of the cooperatives.  
According to its Chairman, AG1 is now a strong and viable organisation. It comprises over 
600 households with more than 3,000 family members, and controls over 500 ha of 
agricultural land. However, total capital of the cooperative is still very low, about 2,175 
million VND (87,000 USD). The operating capital for running service activities is even 
lower, accounting for only 25 percent of total capital or just 21,750 USD. The rest is the 
value of fixed assets. The Chairman of AG1 noted that the low level of operating capital has 
impeded the implementation of service provision to members of the cooperative.  
AG2 
Compared to AG1, AG2 is a ‘newcomer’ having been established in 2003. Interviewed 
farmers noted that before joining the cooperative, they operated as individual households. 
Every morning, farmers brought their vegetables to a local market to sell. If the vegetables 
were accepted by vegetable stall owners, farmers would sell all their products at a wholesale 
price; otherwise they would sell them to consumers in the market. If they could not sell all 
their vegetables, they would bring them back to the village and sell them to other households 
as poultry food. Farmers did not maintain a long term plan for crop selection, rather they 
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planted based on the current price in the market. If a particular vegetable price was low, its 
cultivation would be stopped and a different vegetable crop would be sown. Therefore, their 
income from vegetables was very low and highly dependent on the fluctuations in market 
prices. This led to most farmers lacking surplus capital and prevented them from 
purchasingpesticides and fertilisers. Farmers did not pay attention to cultivation techniques to 
improve output because they were either unaware of or lacked information about market 
demand.  
By 2002, purchasing companies, such as supermarkets and food catering companies came to 
the province to propose a plan to purchase clean vegetables on a large scale. This triggered 
authorities into considering the establishment of a co-operative to meet the projected demand. 
AG2 had a very modest start with 20 members, each of whom contributed a total amount of 
200,000 VND (roughly 8 USD), mostly to build a cooperative office (on the borrowed land 
of the commune committee) and for other administrative costs. The management board of the 
cooperative initially had three people who worked without salary. 
From the outset, AG2 was actively supported by the provincial Department of Agriculture 
and Rural Development (DARD). For example, the DARD distributed a budget of nearly 100 
million VND (4,000 USD) to support the cultivation of clean vegetables by providing 
training on cultivation techniques to all members of the cooperative. Most importantly, 
DARD facilitated the signing of contract farming between the cooperative and agricultural 
product purchasers. Previously, the cooperative focused on production, and passively waited 
for purchasers to come to them. Based on their wide networks, DARD was in touch with a 
large number of potential purchasers and acted as a link between these companies and AG2. 
At present, there are 36 companies including both small retail stores and large purchasing 
companies that have signed contracts with AG2 for the supply of vegetables.  
The terms and conditions in these contracts specify that the cooperative is responsible for 
vegetable origins and their quality, and that government food safety standards will be strictly 
adhered. The board members of the cooperative thus monitor closely the cultivation process 
at each household member to ensure the quality is met. Also AG2 is responsible for 
delivering the products in accordance with the terms of the contract relating to quantity, time 
and place of delivery. Selling prices are set at the market level. However, the cooperative 
offers purchasers preferential conditions such as deferred payment after the delivery of the 
products. If the price set in the contract is higher than the market price due to price 
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fluctuations, the purchasers have the right to deduct the difference during the next trading 
round.  
Interviewed farmers believed that they now have much better knowledge of cultivating, 
harvesting, packaging, categorising and transporting their products as well as better access to 
market information. Therefore, their incomes from clean vegetable have significantly 
improved. Members are committed to the cooperative and always give priority to the 
cooperative when it comes to selling their products. They appreciate that their products are 
bought at a fair market price and that they are shielded from fluctuations in market demand, 
which was a big concern for farmers prior to the cooperative. The Chairman shared that 
cooperative membership has increased from 20 persons in 2003 to 34 persons currently. 
According to him, on average, the cooperative members earn around 50-70 million VND per 
ha (2,000 – 2,800 USD), compared to 20 -50 million VND per ha (800 – 2,000 USD) when 
they operated individually prior to 2003.  
5. Discussions  
Smallbone and Welter (2001) observed that the dominant feature influencing the nature and 
pace of entrepreneurship development in transition economies is the external environment, 
which, in some cases, appears hostile in social, economic and political terms. In addition, the 
social context inherited from the former socialist period appears to affect both the attitudes 
and behaviour of entrepreneurs and the attitudes of society at large towards entrepreneurship. 
Like the private sector, agricultural cooperatives in Vietnam have encountered numerous 
problems from the lack of enterprise culture during the socialist period. In addition, the 
support infrastructure has not always been sufficient to help them to overcome such 
problems. The Vietnamese economy has market institutions and infrastructures that are 
largely undeveloped (Le et al., 2006). They face higher transaction costs and have limited 
access to credit and other inputs.  
Transition economies have experienced a combination of privatisation, entry of new private 
firms and fundamental changes in the legal, institutional and regulatory systems. Vietnam has 
experienced similar changes which improve the overall business environment including the 
legal framework for for agricultural cooperatives. The development of the new model of 
cooperatives in Vietnam since the Law on Cooperatives was adopted in 1997 has been 
supported by different agencies in Vietnam. They include the Cooperative Department at the 
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Ministry of Planning and Investment, which is responsible for formulating strategies and 
policies for the development of cooperatives in Vietnam; the  Vietnam Cooperative Alliance, 
which aims to support, promote and represent cooperatives at different policy levels; and the 
Department of Cooperatives and Rural Development at the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, which solely focuses on agricultural cooperatives.  The activities of these key 
agencies aim at promoting the establishment of new cooperatives, training to existing 
cooperative staff, trade promotion, and upgrading facilities, equipment and technology to 
expand production. Government policy documents indicate that the Government intends to 
support cooperatives by providing (i) incentives for the establishment of cooperatives; (ii) 
training for management staff; (iii) access to land and premises; (iv) access to credit; (v) tax 
cuts; (vi) trade promotion; (vii) technology and extension services; (viii) facilities and 
equipment; and (ix) establishment of the cooperative development fund (Government of 
Vietnam, 2005). The government allocates a portion of the budget to different agencies to 
carry out activities in the above areas according to a yearly plan (MPI 2012). 
The case studies indicate that appropriate support from the government can greatly 
enhance the performance of agricultural cooperatives. Government policy has had a strong 
influence on farmer cooperative establishment and development. This finding is similar to 
studies of farmer cooperatives development in China, a country that shares many 
similarities to Vietnam in terms of historical traditions, domestic economies, which are 
predominantly agrarian and rice cultivating, and the transition from formerly central-
planned into increasingly market-oriented economies (see  for example Garnevska et al. 
2011). However, it is contrary to Bekkum’s (2001) research findings that show that 
government policy has a limited impact on cooperative development in liberalized 
economies. 
Although an extensive range of support policies are available to cooperatives, there is still a 
problem with their implementation. The policies have not been consistently implemented 
across agencies or at different administrative levels. Therefore, the support seems to be 
dependent on the efforts of government officials or cooperative leaders. For example, it is 
always difficult to get access to credit for cooperatives to invest and expand their production 
but a personal relationship between the cooperative manager and local government officials 
can make it easier. Another issue is the lack of targeted support measures for sectors and sub-
sectors. The high level support programs have not been effective in meeting the needs of 
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specific sectors. For example, training courses are provided in the area of product  marketing 
but not at the level of marketing of agricultural produce. 
Agricultural cooperatives account for more than half of the existing cooperatives in Vietnam.  
They have contributed significantly to creating employment and income for their own 
members and additional workers. Despite the decline in the number of agricultural 
cooperatives in the last 10 years, they still provide a large number of employment.  However, 
the share of the collective sector in general and agricultural cooperatives in particular in GDP 
is still limited. The collective sector contributed only 5.2 per cent to GDP in 2011 making it 
the smallest sector in the economy of Vietnam (GSO 2012).  Furthermore, the size of 
agricultural cooperatives in Vietnam is relatively small with 20 members on average for each 
cooperative (GSO 2012, 59). Thus, they could increase their size to reach a more efficient 
scale. 
Future development of cooperatives in Vietnam need to focus on supporting cooperatives to 
expand, become more diversified in their activities, improve management staff capacity and 
worker skills.  In the agriculture sector, provinces are asked by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development to identify models that work in different sub-sectors and in different 
types of products and services so that they can be replicated in similar contexts (Nguyen 
2012). Efforts are being focused on innovating, developing and improving the efficiency of 
current agricultural co-operatives. In addition, the development of agricultural cooperatives 
with operations in production, business, and general services as well as specialized 
agricultural cooperatives are being encouraged by the Government. Increasingly, agriculture 
cooperatives attempt to offer quality produce with better value to not only the local market 
but also export markets. 
6. Implications  
Theoretical implications 
As discussed in the literature review, an institutionalist approach is a very useful tool to 
analysis firms’ behaviours.  It highlights the causal relation between institutional 
arrangements and firms’ structure and characteristics. This study acknowledges the 
contributions of the institutionalist approach. However, it is argued that the institutionalist 
analysis comes short in investigating transitional economies and the form of economic 
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organisations which exist within them as it fails to convey a sense of ‘changefulness’ of a 
business system (Martin and Beaumont, 2001). Taking into account profound changes and 
volatility within the Vietnamese business system in the last three decades and in the external 
environments (the process of regionalisation and globalisation), this research sees the need to 
integrate the notion of institutional dynamics into the current ‘static’ institutionalism (Thelen 
and Steimo, 1992).  
Furthermore, it is clear that in the context of Vietnam, despite the availability of extensive 
institutions set out to govern and and support agricultural cooperatives, their successful 
development is not guarranteed. Formal  institutions could not make agricultural cooperatives 
work in the earlier periods. Many  initiatives failed or encountered strong resistance because 
without the basic principles of voluntary participation, there was a lack of participation from 
cooperative members. In addition, formal institutions alone do not automatically lead to the 
implementation of supporting policies at the local level to benefit agricultural cooperatives. 
Thus, an institutionalist approach which solely relies on a rational assumption of a direct link 
between institutional arrangements and the development of business organisations  (Maurice 
et al., 1996; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Lane, 1992; Whitley, 1999) will fail to fully 
explain the success or failure of cooperatives as demonstrated in this study. An integrative 
approach that highlights the roles all the stakeholders, their bargaining powers and the 
interaction amongst them is needed in any analysis of firms’ behaviours. Furthermore, it is 
not only institutioanl arrangement at national level needs to account for the development 
of organisations, their agencies at provincial and local levels are also extremely 
important in this process. 
Practical implications 
Vietnam’s experience with the transformation of the cooperative sector could offer several 
useful lessons for other economies attemping to develop agricultural cooperatives. First, the 
formation of cooperatives should be based on voluntary participation. The coercive nature of 
agricultural cooperatives in earlier periods in Vietnam resulted in the limited success of the 
cooperatives as it did not provide incentives for members to perform and deliver. Second, 
new policy and regulation to support cooperatives do not automatically lead to growth in the 
number of cooperatives. In fact, the number of cooperatives established should not be seen as 
a success factor of government policy . Administrators shoud  also focus on quality and 
efficiency of the newly formed cooperatives and not only on growing the number per se. 
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Third, policy implementation has to be monitored closely as it is the key to delivering 
intended outcomes and this is particularly important at the local level. It is important to make 
timely adjustments that are relevant to sectoral and local conditions to support the growth and 
development of cooperatives. Fourth, the transition towards a market economy requires 
cooperative managers to upgrade their business management knowledge and skills which had 
been poorly developed during the central planning period and are not suitable in the current 
situation. Fifth, diversifying products, upgrading technology, introducing innovation have the 
potential to increase efficiency and this will help cooperatives to add value, become more 
competitive and move up the value chain. Finally, policymakers and cooperative managers 
will need to set priorities for each period in the development of cooperatives so that their 
limited and valuable resources can be maximised to achieve their respective goals for each 
period.  
7. Limitations 
This research has been conducted within a definite time scale and is subject to some 
limitations in research methodology and scope. First, adopting a qualitative method, it does 
not rely on a large sample as with a survey approach. The rationale of choosing the 
qualitative method is provided in the methodology section, and the approach has been proven 
to be a sharp tool to solve the research questions posed by this research; nevertheless, broad 
generalisation to a large number of cooperatives can be problematic. Second, the study 
concentrates only on one industry. If the research had encompassed other industries, the 
outcomes would have consisted of a more complete picture of cooperatives across industries. 
Lastly, the focus of this study is on two successful cooperatives, thus unsuccessful 
cooperatives are excluded from this study. An analysis of unsuccessful firms could have 
provided valuable lessons on the management of cooperatives, especially in the context of 
transforming economies.  
 
8. Conclusion 
Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives have witnessed great changes and transformation in the 
last six decades and are still in a transformation phase, whereby there is a slow conversion of 
the old-type cooperative to the new cooperative type guided by the Cooperative Law. The 
successful cases of agricultural cooperatives outlined in this study suggest that the new model 
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of agricultural cooperatives could work well in the context of a transitioning economy. Most 
agricultural cooperatives have been able to provide valuable services to their members, 
especially input supply, marketing and selling of agricultural outputs. Some cooperatives 
have diversified their services by mobilising investment capital, developing production 
planning, building market share, creating jobs, and achieving high returns (Phuong 2008).  
Using an institutionalist approach, this research argues that the legal environment and 
appropriate government policy and support are extremely important for the successful 
development of cooperatives. The Cooperative Law 1997 and its revisions in 2003 and 2012 
have set up the legal framework to encourage the formulation and development of 
commercialised agricultural cooperatives at the national level. However, the two case studies 
presented here have demonstrated that not only national institutions’ influences but also those 




Table 1: Basic information on agricultural service cooperative development in Vietnam 
Development periods after de-
collectivisation 
Main characteristics 
1986-1996: collective farms still operated as 
service providers,  
• Basic services to farmers: extension, input 
supply, irrigation, electricity; no marketing. 
• Government promotion, but almost no 
financial support. 
Since 1997: Cooperative Law became 
effective: recognized as registered legal 
entities under the law; transformation of still 
operational cooperatives (‘old style’ into ‘new 
style’), set-up of new ones from scratch 
• Better services: extension, input supply, 
irrigation, electricity, basic marketing 
activities. 
• Limited support from government. 
Source: Adapted from Son, 2009; Wolz and Pham, 2010 
Table 2: Case Study Profiles  
 
AG1 AG2 
Year of establishment 1978 2004 
Location Tien Giang province Vinh Long province 
Product rice (main product); poultry 
farming, handicraft production, 
construction services, ice 
factories, mixing of animal feeds 
(other products) 
clean vegetables (green 
vegetable, fennel, roots and 
fruits) 
Area of cultivation 500 ha 85 ha 
Number of members 3,000 34 
Table 3: Interviewee Distribution and Characteristics 
 AG1 AG2 Government Official 







3 (1 from the Cooperative 
Department at the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment, and 
2 from the provincial 
Departments of Agriculture 
and Rural Development) 
Cooperative Member 4 (2 female and 
2 male) 
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